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Abstract:	  Responding	  to	  this	  issue’s	  invitation	  to	  bring	  new	  disciplinary	  insights	  to	  the	  field	  of	  improvement	  science,	  this	  article	  takes	  as	  its	  starting	  point	  one	  of	  the	  field’s	  guiding	  metaphors:	  the	  imperative	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”.	  	  Drawing	  on	  insights	  from	  anthropology,	  history,	  and	  philosophy,	  the	  article	  reflects	  on	  the	  origins	  and	  implications	  of	  this	  metaphoric	  imperative,	  and	  suggests	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  might	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  means	  and	  ends	  of	  improvement.	  	  If	  the	  industrial	  origins	  of	  improvement	  science	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  inform	  a	  metaphor	  of	  gaps,	  chasms,	  and	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  as	  invariably	  imperfect	  and	  potentially	  dangerous,	  and	  therefore	  requiring	  bridging	  or	  closure,	  other	  currents	  that	  feed	  the	  discipline	  of	  improvement	  science	  suggest	  the	  potential	  value	  and	  uses	  of	  spaces	  of	  openness	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  These	  currents	  include	  the	  science	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems,	  and	  certain	  precepts	  of	  philosophical	  pragmatism	  acknowledged	  to	  inform	  improvement	  science.	  	  Going	  a	  step	  further,	  I	  reflect	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  to	  contrasting	  approaches	  within	  improvement	  science	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  incommensurable	  paradigms,	  and	  what	  each	  approach	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  accommodating	  seemingly	  irreconcilable	  or	  incommensurable	  approaches	  within	  improvement	  science.	  	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  and	  returning	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  this	  special	  issue,	  do	  they	  comprise	  an	  instance	  wherein	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  not	  minding	  the	  gap	  –	  now	  in	  the	  form	  of	  different	  paradigms	  –	  can	  be	  benefit	  improvement	  science?	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A	  newcomer	  to	  the	  field	  of	  improvement	  science	  might	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  that	  healthcare	  improvement	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  project	  of	  gap	  closure:	  from	  bridging	  the	  iconic	  “quality	  chasm”	  proclaimed	  by	  the	  landmark	  Institute	  of	  Medicine	  2001	  report	  [1],	  to	  closing	  the	  “implementation	  gap”	  between	  what	  is	  
known	  about	  effective	  care	  and	  what	  is	  actually	  done	  in	  practice	  [2],	  the	  terrain	  of	  improvement	  science	  might	  appear	  to	  the	  newcomer	  to	  be	  textured	  by	  dangerous	  crevices	  and	  gullies,	  and	  even	  the	  occasional	  abyss.	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  this	  challenging	  topography,	  the	  discipline’s	  mandate	  and	  mission	  might	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  bridging	  gaps,	  fording	  chasms,	  and	  correcting	  improper	  alignments.	  In	  sum,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  regard	  “mind	  the	  gap!”	  to	  be	  a	  fitting	  exhortatory	  motto	  for	  improvement	  science.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  special	  issue’s	  goal	  of	  bringing	  new	  disciplinary	  perspectives	  to	  constructively	  bear	  on	  improvement	  science,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  critically	  reflect	  on	  this	  imperative	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”:	  	  from	  where	  does	  this	  imagery	  come,	  when	  and	  how	  does	  it	  serve	  the	  ends	  of	  improvement	  science,	  and	  when	  might	  it	  be	  less	  conducive	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  improving	  healthcare?	  	  What	  might	  be	  lost	  or	  excluded	  when	  we	  regard	  gaps	  as	  always	  and	  invariably	  dangerous,	  and	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  as	  necessarily	  imperfect?	  	  When	  might	  benefits	  be	  had	  if	  we	  do	  not	  	  “mind	  the	  gap”?	  	  In	  pursuing	  this	  thought	  experiment	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  insights	  from	  anthropology,	  history,	  and	  philosophy	  to	  suggest	  how	  the	  pervasive	  mandate	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”	  might	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  some	  of	  the	  core	  philosophical	  precepts	  on	  which	  improvement	  science	  is	  based.	  	  	  In	  the	  process	  I	  will	  also	  suggest	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  same	  conceptual	  schemes	  and	  habits	  of	  thought	  that	  lend	  coherence	  and	  urgency	  to	  the	  imperative	  might	  also	  inform	  an	  impulse	  to	  construe	  improvement	  science	  in	  narrow	  paradigmatic	  terms	  that	  can	  unnecessarily	  exclude	  other	  disciplinary	  perspectives.	  	  	  	  Framing	  the	  Problem:	  The	  “Quality	  Chasm”	  as	  Conceptual	  Metaphor	  At	  first	  glance,	  thinking	  about	  problems	  in	  healthcare	  in	  terms	  of	  gaps	  and	  chasms,	  and	  solutions	  in	  terms	  of	  bridges,	  crossings,	  and	  other	  processes	  and	  devices	  of	  re-­‐alignment	  and	  closure,	  might	  seem	  self-­‐evident	  to	  anyone	  with	  even	  a	  passing	  familiarity	  with	  improvement	  science.	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1990s	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  and	  reports	  revealed	  staggering	  and	  theretofore	  unrecognized	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shortcomings	  in	  the	  health	  care	  systems	  of	  industrialized	  countries,	  such	  that	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  on	  average	  one	  in	  ten	  hospitalizations	  resulted	  in	  preventable	  harm,	  including	  death	  [3].	  	  A	  study	  in	  2000	  found	  that	  on	  average	  it	  took	  seventeen	  years	  to	  get	  14%	  of	  results	  from	  randomized	  controlled	  trial	  studies	  into	  practice	  [4].	  	  This	  slow	  rate	  of	  uptake	  was	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  staggering	  rate	  at	  which	  new	  findings	  from	  medical	  studies	  were	  being	  published:	  medical	  knowledge	  was	  proliferating	  at	  an	  exponential	  rate,	  and	  far	  outstripping	  the	  capacity	  of	  medical	  professionals	  to	  access	  it,	  let	  alone	  put	  it	  into	  practice	  [5].	  The	  extent	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  further	  underscored	  with	  the	  2003	  finding	  that	  in	  a	  full	  45%	  of	  cases	  Americans	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  care	  that	  would	  be	  indicated	  by	  the	  best	  available	  evidence	  [6].	  	  Hence	  to	  a	  significant	  extent,	  the	  epidemic	  of	  unsafe,	  poor	  quality	  healthcare	  that	  was	  coming	  into	  focus	  was	  being	  diagnosed	  in	  terms	  of	  failures	  to	  implement	  what	  was	  recognized	  to	  be	  best	  practice,	  be	  it	  clinical,	  managerial,	  or	  organizational	  practice.	  	  	  Today	  our	  thinking	  about	  these	  urgent	  problems	  has	  come	  to	  be	  inseparably	  bound	  up	  with	  particular	  images	  and	  metaphors.	  	  Arguably	  the	  most	  iconic	  and	  influential	  of	  these	  was	  proclaimed	  in	  2001	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  
Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm:	  A	  New	  Health	  System	  of	  the	  21st	  Century.	  	  On	  its	  first	  page	  the	  report	  proclaimed	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  disjuncture	  alluded	  to	  in	  its	  title:	  “between	  the	  health	  care	  that	  we	  now	  have	  and	  the	  health	  care	  that	  we	  could	  have	  lies	  not	  just	  a	  gap,	  but	  a	  chasm”	  [1].	  	  The	  abysmal	  dimensions	  of	  the	  problem	  were	  intimated	  by	  the	  report’s	  cover	  image,	  a	  somewhat	  abstract	  rendering	  of	  what	  might	  be	  variously	  construed	  as	  rent	  fabric,	  a	  cleft	  structure,	  or	  a	  seismologically	  ruptured	  cross-­‐section	  of	  earth.	  	  The	  implication	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  gaps,	  spaces	  in-­‐between,	  and	  states	  of	  misalignment	  or	  disjuncture	  are	  sources	  of	  unabated	  risk	  and	  danger,	  and	  require	  reparation	  by	  means	  of	  suturing,	  realignment,	  or	  bridging.	  	  	  We	  might	  think	  of	  the	  quality	  chasm	  and	  the	  gaps	  that	  implementation	  science	  seeks	  to	  close	  as	  variations	  on	  an	  overarching	  conceptual	  template,	  or	  what	  cognitive	  linguists	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor.	  	  Conceptual	  metaphors	  are	  common	  linguistic	  phenomena	  whereby	  one	  concept	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  [7].	  	  Far	  from	  being	  superficial	  features	  of	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language,	  or	  ornamental	  accessories	  characteristic	  of	  poetic	  expression,	  cognitive	  metaphors	  are	  fundamental	  to	  human	  language	  and	  cognition,	  and	  facilitate	  one’s	  ability	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  new	  concept	  or	  experiential	  domain	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  that	  is	  more	  familiar.	  	  This	  mapping	  across	  conceptual	  domains	  facilitates	  understanding	  and	  logical	  inference,	  and	  typically	  involves	  understanding	  an	  abstract	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  concept	  that	  is	  more	  concrete.	  	  A	  paradigmatic	  example	  provided	  by	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  is	  “time	  is	  money”,	  an	  association	  which	  lends	  coherence	  to	  a	  host	  of	  other	  formulations	  and	  inferences,	  such	  as	  “wasting	  time”,	  “living	  on	  borrowed	  time”,	  repaying	  a	  debt	  to	  society	  by	  “serving	  time”,	  or	  even	  something	  being	  “worth	  one’s	  while”.	  Cognitive	  metaphors	  are	  frequently	  implicit	  rather	  than	  explicit,	  and	  are	  often	  so	  thoroughly	  embedded	  in	  a	  culture’s	  language,	  thought,	  and	  norms	  of	  behavior	  that	  they	  may	  go	  completely	  unnoticed,	  and	  assume	  a	  cast	  of	  natural	  givenness	  or	  inevitability.	  	  	  Because	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  cognitive	  metaphor	  in	  conditioning	  thought	  and	  action,	  it	  follows	  that	  reflection	  on	  the	  “metaphors	  we	  live	  by”	  (the	  title	  of	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson’s	  influential	  1980	  book	  on	  the	  subject)	  can	  support	  innovative	  thinking	  and	  creative	  problem	  solving.	  	  To	  pursue	  this	  insight	  in	  relation	  to	  improvement	  science	  generally	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  “quality	  chasm”	  in	  particular	  is	  in	  no	  way	  to	  question	  the	  importance	  of	  putting	  evidence	  into	  practice,	  or	  the	  value	  of	  efforts	  to	  promote	  the	  uptake	  of	  research	  findings.	  	  Rather,	  reflection	  on	  the	  conceptual	  metaphors	  that	  guide	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  thinking	  in	  improvement	  science	  can	  alert	  us	  to	  their	  possible	  limitations	  and	  stimulate	  new	  insights.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  describe	  how	  the	  industrial	  origins	  of	  improvement	  science	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  inform	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor	  of	  gaps,	  chasms,	  and	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  as	  invariably	  imperfect,	  defective,	  or	  
potentially	  dangerous.	  	  Over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  these	  industrially-­‐inflected	  associations	  have	  been	  augmented	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  challenged	  by	  precepts	  associated	  with	  complexity	  science	  and	  post-­‐industrial	  forms	  of	  production	  and	  management.	  	  These	  developments	  inform	  an	  alternative	  conceptual	  scheme	  which	  evinces	  a	  much	  greater	  tolerance	  for	  uncertainty,	  non-­‐alignment,	  and	  the	  “spaces	  in	  between”.	  	  Such	  an	  ethos	  or	  sensibility	  arguably	  has	  an	  important	  role	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to	  play	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  improvement,	  not	  least	  of	  all	  as	  it	  can	  powerfully	  inform	  receptiveness	  to	  alternative	  disciplinary	  approaches.	  	  Nonetheless	  such	  an	  orientation	  tends	  to	  be	  disparaged	  and	  marginalized	  as	  being	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  rigor,	  certainty,	  and	  epistemic	  probity	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  condition	  for	  –	  and	  the	  mark	  of	  –	  serious	  scientific	  endeavor.	  	  My	  interrogation	  of	  the	  mandate	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap!”	  is	  intended	  to	  serve	  a	  double	  purpose.	  	  First,	  such	  an	  exercise	  will	  suggest	  how	  gaps	  left	  open,	  tentative	  definitions,	  and	  imperfectly	  resolved	  boundaries	  might	  in	  some	  cases	  enhance	  rather	  than	  impede	  the	  aims	  of	  improvement	  science.	  	  Second,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  appositely	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  special	  issue,	  I	  have	  a	  hunch	  that	  the	  same	  conceptual	  scheme	  that	  supports	  a	  categorical	  insistence	  on	  gap	  closure,	  tidy	  alignment,	  and	  the	  eradication	  of	  ambiguity	  also	  strongly	  informs	  an	  impulse	  within	  improvement	  science	  to	  cast	  a	  suspicious	  eye	  upon	  disciplinary	  approaches	  and	  knowledge	  practices	  other	  than	  those	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  natural	  sciences	  and	  clinical	  research.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  imperative	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”	  maps	  onto	  concerns	  with	  paradigmatic	  integrity,	  it	  provides	  a	  fittingly	  indigenous	  vehicle	  for	  engaging	  some	  of	  the	  larger	  issues	  and	  questions	  posed	  by	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  special	  issue.	  	  Contours	  of	  the	  Quality	  Chasm	  as	  Conceptual	  Metaphor:	  Industrial	  Origins	  The	  fact	  that	  improvement	  science	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  industrial	  manufacturing	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  [8]	  provides	  a	  useful	  backdrop	  for	  thinking	  about	  some	  of	  the	  habits	  of	  thought	  and	  inference	  fostered	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  “quality	  chasm”	  as	  conceptual	  metaphor.	  “Quality”	  in	  industrial	  manufacture	  was	  initially	  bound	  up	  with	  standardization	  and	  the	  minimization	  of	  variation,	  and	  was	  closely	  related	  to	  notions	  of	  “fitness	  for	  purpose”	  or	  “conformance	  to	  requirements	  and	  “one	  best	  way”	  of	  doing	  things	  [9].	  	  Because	  this	  original	  rendering	  of	  quality	  improvement	  arose	  in	  the	  context	  of	  industrial	  production	  as	  epitomized	  by	  the	  Fordist	  assembly	  line,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  problems	  and	  inefficiencies	  could	  be	  readily	  figured	  in	  terms	  of	  gaps,	  spaces	  of	  disjuncture,	  disarticulation	  or	  misalignment.	  	  In	  this	  industrial	  regime	  problems	  would	  certainly	  ensue	  if	  factors	  of	  production	  were	  not	  properly	  aligned,	  be	  those	  factors	  mechanical	  cogs;	  undisciplined	  or	  refractory	  workers;	  or	  weak	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links	  in	  chains	  of	  supply	  or	  communication.	  	  What’s	  more,	  the	  fact	  that	  statistics	  was	  recognized	  early	  on	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  in	  the	  identification	  and	  correction	  of	  normative	  deviations	  and	  deficits	  in	  the	  production	  process	  reinforced	  a	  vision	  of	  mathematically	  achievable	  precision	  in	  the	  minimization	  of	  variation	  and	  the	  remedying	  of	  inefficiencies.1	  	  This	  valorization	  of	  alignment,	  uniformity	  and	  the	  minimization	  of	  deviation	  was	  continuous	  with	  both	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  science	  to	  enhance	  efficiency	  and	  rationalization,	  and	  a	  mid-­‐century	  cultural	  ethos	  that	  put	  a	  high	  premium	  on	  discipline	  and	  conformity	  as	  civic	  virtues	  unto	  themselves.	  	  This	  vision	  of	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  bounties	  presumed	  to	  flow	  from	  mathematically	  reckoned	  norms	  and	  processes	  was	  boldly	  proclaimed	  in	  1931	  by	  Walter	  Shewhart,	  one	  of	  the	  early	  pioneers	  of	  improvement	  science	  in	  industry:	  	  	  	  The	  object	  of	  industry	  is	  to	  set	  up	  economic	  ways	  of	  satisfying	  human	  wants	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  to	  reduce	  everything	  possible	  to	  routines	  requiring	  a	  minimum	  amount	  of	  human	  effort.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  scientific	  method,	  extended	  to	  take	  account	  of	  modern	  statistical	  concepts,	  it	  has	  been	  found	  possible	  to	  set	  up	  limits	  within	  which	  the	  results	  of	  routine	  efforts	  must	  lie	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  economical.	  	  Deviations	  in	  the	  results	  of	  a	  routine	  process	  outside	  such	  limits	  indicate	  that	  the	  routine	  has	  broken	  down	  and	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  economical	  until	  the	  cause	  of	  trouble	  is	  removed.	  [10]	  	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  the	  mandate	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  precisely	  specified	  norms	  and	  targets;	  an	  aspiration	  to	  complete	  routinization;	  and	  the	  subordination	  of	  other	  concerns	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  economization.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  comprises	  a	  form	  of	  gap	  closure	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  future-­‐oriented	  behavior	  is	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  rigorously	  pre-­‐specified	  expectations,	  and	  outcomes	  are	  to	  be	  judged	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  correspondence,	  or	  tightness	  of	  the	  fit,	  between	  them.	  This	  aspiration	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  uniformity,	  complete	  routinization	  and	  standardization	  in	  industry	  would	  come	  to	  be	  qualified	  and	  modulated	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Three	  of	  the	  founding	  figures	  of	  improvement	  science	  –	  Walter	  Shewhart	  (1891-­‐1962),	  W.	  Edwards	  Deming	  (1900-­‐1993),	  and	  Joseph	  Juran	  (1904-­‐2008)	  –	  were	  American	  statisticians	  and	  engineers,	  variously	  active	  in	  industrial	  manufacturing,	  military	  production	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  the	  post-­‐War	  reconstruction	  of	  Japanese	  industry.	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1980s	  and	  1990s,	  especially	  in	  association	  with	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “quality	  revolution”	  in	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe	  [11].	  	  Spurred	  in	  large	  part	  by	  fear	  of	  declining	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  face	  of	  surging	  Japanese	  industrial	  and	  economic	  might,	  the	  “quality	  revolution”	  involved	  the	  adoption	  of	  more	  flexible	  and	  less	  hierarchical	  forms	  of	  workplace	  organization	  and	  management,	  and	  entailed	  a	  vastly	  expanded	  notion	  of	  “quality”:	  no	  longer	  was	  quality	  narrowly	  associated	  with	  consistency	  (of	  product,	  process,	  or	  outcome);	  in	  this	  period	  quality	  came	  to	  be	  increasingly	  associated	  with	  less	  tangible	  or	  readily	  quantifiable	  attributes,	  such	  as	  workplace	  culture,	  and	  the	  attitudinal	  and	  dispositional	  attributes	  of	  workers	  and	  managers	  alike.	  	  [12,	  13]	  While	  continuous	  with	  the	  original	  industrial	  rendering	  of	  “improvement”	  in	  name	  and	  core	  methodological	  precepts,	  this	  newer	  version	  also	  differed	  in	  significant	  ways:	  its	  softer,	  more	  self-­‐reflexive	  orientation	  found	  expression	  in	  a	  strong	  penchant	  for	  organic	  and	  even	  spiritual	  imagery	  over	  the	  mechanical.	  	  Additionally,	  as	  “quality”	  came	  to	  be	  recursively	  ascribed	  to	  almost	  anything	  bearing	  on	  an	  organization’s	  aims	  or	  activities	  (including	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  an	  organization	  would	  monitor	  its	  own	  quality),2	  the	  pursuit	  of	  improvement	  became	  more	  urgent,	  but	  also	  significantly	  more	  diffuse	  and	  open-­‐ended.	  	  Improvement	  methodologies	  were	  expanding	  dramatically,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  disciplines	  they	  drew	  upon,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  range	  of	  objects	  (and	  subjects)	  to	  which	  they	  were	  being	  applied	  [12,	  13].	  	  In	  this	  context	  improvement	  experts	  such	  as	  Deming	  were	  unabashedly	  styled	  as	  “gurus”	  [8],	  and	  a	  number	  of	  competing	  improvement	  methodologies	  came	  to	  be	  aggressively	  marketed	  as	  proprietary	  brands.3	  	  	  Improvement	  science	  in	  healthcare	  came	  of	  age	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  quality	  revolution	  of	  the1980s	  and1990s,4	  and	  today	  seems	  to	  bear	  the	  imprint	  of	  two	  rather	  different	  sensibilities	  –	  one	  that	  embraces	  ideals	  of	  precision	  and	  mastery,	  and	  accords	  with	  the	  mandate	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”,	  and	  another	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  global	  and	  recursive	  character	  of	  quality	  improvement	  was	  formalized	  with	  the	  adoption	  in	  1987	  of	  ISO	  9000,	  an	  international	  series	  of	  standards	  for	  the	  certification	  of	  both	  quality	  and	  the	  means	  by	  which	  it	  will	  be	  assured.	  	  	  3	  These	  include	  Lean,	  Six	  Sigma,	  Total	  Quality	  Management,	  and	  the	  Toyota	  Production	  System.	  4	  The	  Institute	  of	  Medicine’s	  two	  landmark	  reports,	  To	  Err	  is	  Human	  and	  Crossing	  the	  Quality	  
Chasm	  were	  published	  in	  1999	  and	  2001	  respectively,	  and	  according	  to	  Martin	  Marshall	  the	  term	  “improvement	  science”	  itself	  had	  been	  in	  use	  in	  medicine	  for	  at	  least	  a	  decade	  prior	  to	  that	  [14].	  
8	  	  
	   8	  
doesn’t	  just	  cope	  with	  openness	  and	  spaces	  of	  indeterminacy,	  ambiguity,	  and	  unboundedness,	  but	  actively	  embraces	  them	  as	  resources	  unto	  themselves	  and	  sources	  of	  potential	  value.	  	  While	  recognizing	  that	  each	  of	  these	  contrasting	  stances	  and	  sensibilities	  is	  suited	  to	  different	  ends,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  worthwhile	  to	  dwell	  on	  the	  contrast	  between	  them,	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  their	  uneasy	  coexistence	  has	  something	  useful	  to	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  openness	  or	  otherwise	  of	  improvement	  science	  to	  alternative	  disciplinary	  approaches.	  	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  “quality	  of	  care”	  as	  the	  object	  of	  improvement	  provided	  by	  renowned	  British	  patient	  safety	  expert	  Charles	  Vincent:	  	  	  [Quality	  of	  care]	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  proportion	  of	  potential	  health	  gain	  actually	  delivered	  by	  a	  healthcare	  organization	  for	  its	  set	  of	  patients.	  	  The	  essential	  idea	  is	  that	  quality	  reflects	  the	  gap	  between	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	  and	  what	  actually	  happens.	  	  When	  the	  gap	  is	  small,	  quality	  is	  good;	  when	  the	  gap	  is	  large,	  quality	  is	  poor.	  [3]	  	  Contrast	  this	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  quality	  improvement	  by	  American	  academic	  physicians	  Paul	  Batalden	  and	  Frank	  Davidoff:	  	  Many	  in	  healthcare	  today	  are	  interested	  in	  defining	  “quality	  improvement”.	  	  We	  propose	  defining	  it	  as	  the	  combined	  and	  unceasing	  efforts	  of	  everyone	  –	  healthcare	  professionals,	  patients	  and	  their	  families,	  researchers,	  payers,	  planners	  and	  educators	  –	  to	  make	  the	  changes	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  better	  patient	  outcomes	  (health),	  better	  system	  performance	  (care)	  and	  better	  professional	  development	  (learning).	  	  This	  definition	  arises	  from	  our	  conviction	  that	  healthcare	  will	  not	  realize	  its	  full	  potential	  unless	  change	  making	  becomes	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  everyone’s	  job,	  every	  day,	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  system.	  	  Defined	  in	  this	  way,	  improvement	  involves	  a	  substantial	  shift	  in	  our	  idea	  of	  the	  work	  of	  healthcare,	  a	  challenging	  task	  that	  can	  benefit	  from	  the	  use	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  tools	  and	  methods.	  .	  .	  [15]	  	  Vincent’s	  formulation	  recapitulates	  the	  mandate	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”	  in	  two	  senses:	  first,	  with	  the	  explicit	  definition	  of	  quality	  as	  the	  perfect	  alignment	  between	  the	  potential	  and	  the	  actual;	  and	  second,	  with	  the	  crisp,	  formal	  affirmation	  of	  the	  
very	  possibility	  of	  a	  precise	  and	  singular	  definition.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Batalden	  and	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Davidoff	  provide	  a	  definition	  which,	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  all-­‐inclusive	  open-­‐endedness,	  is	  almost	  an	  anti-­‐definition.	  	  Affective	  commitment	  and	  ceaseless	  striving	  become	  primary	  ends	  unto	  themselves,	  and	  improvement	  is	  cast	  as	  emergent,	  with	  no	  predefined	  limits	  or	  finite	  specifications.	  As	  it	  happens,	  the	  latter	  position	  taps	  into	  an	  altogether	  different	  conceptual	  schema	  than	  that	  proclaimed	  by	  Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm.	  	  This	  alternative	  schema	  derives	  from	  complexity	  theory,	  5	  and	  suggests	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  “spaces	  in	  between”	  need	  not	  be	  dangerous	  spaces	  of	  deficits	  and	  defects;	  they	  might	  instead	  contain	  untapped	  resources	  and	  unrealized	  potential.	  	  To	  extend	  the	  “gap”	  metaphor,	  such	  an	  approach	  doesn’t	  just	  seek	  to	  close	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  and	  uncertainty;	  it	  also	  mines	  them	  as	  potential	  sources	  of	  new	  knowledge	  and	  possibility.	  	  A	  brief	  discussion	  of	  this	  alternative	  approach	  and	  the	  debate	  it	  provoked	  will	  help	  to	  crystalize	  some	  of	  the	  less	  obvious	  but	  nonetheless	  important	  issues	  at	  stake	  in	  debates	  about	  the	  inclusiveness	  and	  internal	  coherence	  –	  or	  otherwise	  –	  of	  improvement	  science	  as	  a	  paradigm.	  	  	  	  The	  Chasm	  Reconsidered:	  Complexity	  as	  a	  New	  Conceptual	  Metaphor	  for	  Improvement	  Science	  	  The	  enlistment	  of	  complexity	  theory	  into	  the	  conceptual	  repertoire	  of	  improvement	  science	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “complexity	  turn”	  in	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  sciences	  since	  the	  1980s	  [16].	  	  The	  application	  of	  complexity-­‐inspired	  thinking	  to	  healthcare	  improvement	  was	  announced	  sotto	  voce	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  a	  manifesto-­‐type	  statement	  that	  appears	  as	  an	  appendix	  to	  Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm.	  	  The	  appendix,	  entitled	  “Redesigning	  Health	  Care	  with	  Insights	  from	  the	  Science	  of	  Complex	  Adaptive	  Systems,”	  was	  by	  Paul	  Plsek,	  an	  American	  management	  consultant	  and	  quality	  expert	  trained	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Complexity	  theory	  is	  not	  easily	  defined,	  although	  a	  serviceable	  definition	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  A	  set	  of	  concepts	  that	  attempts	  to	  explain	  complex	  phenomenon	  not	  explainable	  by	  traditional	  (mechanistic)	  theories.	  It	  integrates	  ideas	  derived	  from	  chaos	  theory,	  cognitive	  psychology,	  computer	  science,	  evolutionary	  biology,	  general	  systems	  theory,	  fuzzy	  logic,	  information	  theory,	  and	  other	  related	  fields	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  natural	  and	  artificial	  systems	  as	  they	  are,	  and	  not	  by	  simplifying	  them	  (breaking	  them	  down	  into	  their	  constituent	  parts).	  It	  recognizes	  that	  complex	  behavior	  emerges	  from	  a	  few	  simple	  rules,	  and	  that	  all	  complex	  systems	  are	  networks	  of	  many	  interdependent	  parts	  which	  interact	  according	  to	  those	  rules.	  	  	  (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/complexity-­‐theory.html	  	  accessed	  August	  7,	  2016).	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a	  systems	  engineer.	  	  Around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  report’s	  2001	  release,	  Plsek	  and	  co-­‐author	  Trisha	  Greenhalgh	  also	  published	  a	  series	  of	  four	  articles	  in	  the	  British	  
Medical	  Journal	  (BMJ)	  making	  the	  case	  for	  a	  complexity-­‐informed	  approach	  to	  quality	  improvement	  in	  healthcare.	  	  Together	  the	  appendix	  of	  Crossing	  the	  
Quality	  Chasm	  and	  the	  BMJ	  articles	  deployed	  complexity	  theory	  to	  advance	  an	  approach	  to	  improvement	  that	  differs	  in	  significant	  ways	  from	  the	  original	  industrial	  version,	  and	  effectively	  subverts	  the	  imperative	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”.	  	  	  The	  appendix	  of	  Quality	  Chasm	  begins	  with	  a	  distinction	  between	  systems	  that	  are	  mechanical	  (such	  as	  fans	  and	  thermostats)	  and	  systems	  that	  are	  complex	  and	  adaptive	  (such	  as	  healthcare).6	  	  Unlike	  the	  mechanical	  systems	  characteristic	  of	  Newtonian	  science,	  complex	  systems	  are	  held	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  nonlinearity,	  the	  production	  of	  novelty,	  and	  a	  tendency	  toward	  inherent	  order,	  self-­‐organization,	  and	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  elements	  [1].	  Plsek	  and	  Greenhalgh	  claim	  that	  healthcare	  systems	  are	  currently	  designed	  and	  managed	  on	  faulty	  principles,	  namely	  those	  that	  only	  properly	  apply	  only	  to	  mechanical	  systems	  (such	  as	  the	  industrial	  assembly	  line).	  The	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  Newtonian	  “clockwork”	  universe,	  and	  with	  it	  healthcare	  systems,	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐envisioned	  and	  redesigned	  in	  far	  less	  mechanistic	  terms.	  	  	  Newton's	  “clockwork	  universe,”	  in	  which	  big	  problems	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  smaller	  ones,	  analysed,	  and	  solved	  by	  rational	  deduction,	  has	  strongly	  influenced	  both	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine	  and	  the	  leadership	  of	  organisations.	  For	  example,	  images	  such	  as	  the	  heart	  as	  a	  pump	  frame	  medical	  thinking,	  and	  conventional	  management	  thinking	  assumes	  that	  work	  and	  organisations	  can	  be	  thoroughly	  planned,	  broken	  down	  into	  units,	  and	  optimised.	  But	  the	  machine	  metaphor	  lets	  us	  down	  badly	  when	  no	  part	  of	  the	  equation	  is	  constant,	  independent,	  or	  predictable.	  The	  new	  science	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  may	  provide	  new	  metaphors	  that	  can	  help	  us	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  issues	  better.	  	  [17]	  	  Healthcare	  practitioners	  and	  policy	  makers	  were	  urged	  to	  move	  away	  from	  received	  paradigms	  of	  mastery	  and	  certainty,	  and	  to	  relinquish	  aspirations	  of	  rigid	  planning,	  command,	  and	  control.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  prompted	  to	  attend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Other	  examples	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  include	  the	  human	  body’s	  immune	  system;	  a	  colony	  of	  social	  insects	  such	  as	  termites	  or	  ants;	  and	  the	  stock	  market.	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to	  their	  language	  and	  choice	  of	  metaphor,	  they	  were	  also	  entreated	  to	  embrace	  paradox,	  dwell	  with	  uncertainty,	  and	  give	  free	  rein	  to	  a	  new	  and	  emergent	  sense	  of	  creativity.	  	  In	  complex	  systems,	  unpredictability	  and	  paradox	  are	  ever	  present,	  and	  some	  things	  will	  remain	  unknowable.	  	  New	  conceptual	  frameworks	  that	  incorporate	  a	  dynamic,	  emergent,	  creative,	  and	  intuitive	  view	  of	  the	  world	  must	  replace	  traditional	  “reduce	  and	  resolve”	  approaches	  to	  clinical	  care	  and	  service	  organization.	  [17]	  	  The	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  language	  use	  and	  the	  affordances	  of	  metaphor	  and	  paradox	  in	  particular	  is	  striking,	  and	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  revisioning	  of	  gaps	  and	  chasms	  at	  the	  level	  of	  linguistic	  form:	  As	  has	  been	  suggested,	  metaphor	  operates	  by	  juxtaposing	  one	  kind	  of	  entity	  into	  a	  conceptual	  domain	  with	  which	  it	  is	  not	  typically	  associated	  (“an	  avalanche	  of	  numbers”;	  “a	  stampede	  of	  shoppers”),	  thereby	  giving	  rise	  to	  new	  associations	  and	  possible	  meanings.	  	  On	  this	  view	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  –	  or	  gaps	  and	  disjunctures	  between	  concepts	  –	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  novel	  imaginings,	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  cultivated	  as	  assets	  rather	  than	  eradicated	  as	  imperfections.	  	  Taken	  in	  its	  entirety,	  Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm	  performs	  a	  careful	  balancing	  act:	  the	  title	  proclaims	  the	  need	  to	  bridge	  a	  dangerous	  chasm,	  while	  the	  appendix	  refigures	  and	  revalues	  the	  chasm	  altogether.	  	  And	  curiously,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  strong	  distinction	  asserted	  in	  the	  appendix	  between	  incommensurable	  scientific	  paradigms	  –	  the	  Newtonian	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  order	  and	  clear	  definition,	  and	  the	  paradigm	  of	  complexity	  science,	  with	  its	  embrace	  of	  the	  affordances	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  and	  the	  unknown	  –	  the	  report	  as	  a	  whole	  makes	  no	  effort	  to	  reconcile	  the	  two.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  report	  exemplifies	  (or	  enacts)	  the	  same	  comfort	  with	  paradox	  and	  uncertainty	  which	  the	  appendix	  espouses	  in	  the	  name	  of	  complexity	  theory.	  	  By	  juxtaposing	  two	  antithetical	  paradigms,	  and	  refusing	  to	  acknowledge	  –	  let	  along	  resolve	  –	  the	  tension	  between	  them,	  Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm	  tacitly	  refuses	  its	  titular	  mandate	  to	  bridge,	  harmonize,	  align,	  or	  reconcile.	  	  	  	  “Let	  them	  eat	  complexity”:	  the	  language	  (politics)	  of	  improvement	  science	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It	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  these	  complexity-­‐inflected	  precepts	  and	  prescriptions	  would	  rub	  many	  in	  the	  clinical	  science	  community	  the	  wrong	  way.	  	  In	  an	  acidly	  worded	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  entitled,	  “Let	  them	  eat	  complexity:	  the	  emperor’s	  new	  toolkit”,	  one	  BMJ	  reader	  pilloried	  “complexity	  theory	  as	  metaphor”	  as	  recapitulating	  modish	  intellectual	  trends	  associated	  with	  postmodernism,	  which	  he	  claimed	  to	  be	  romantic	  and	  antirational,	  and	  hence	  antithetical	  to	  the	  values	  of	  scientific	  method	  that	  ought	  to	  rightfully	  guide	  both	  medicine	  and	  improvement	  science.	  	  The	  author	  proclaimed	  the	  complexity	  prescriptions	  to	  be	  “intellectual	  snake	  oil”	  peddled	  by	  “healthcare	  administration	  faddists”	  who	  endanger	  honest	  scientific	  inquiry.	  [18]	  	  That	  “complexity	  as	  metaphor”	  might	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  glib	  and	  frivolous	  affront	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  clinical	  science	  is	  not	  particularly	  surprising;	  why	  these	  prescriptions	  could	  provoke	  such	  a	  strident	  and	  categorical	  response,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  might	  be	  less	  obvious,	  and	  suggestive	  for	  considering	  the	  openness	  or	  otherwise	  of	  improvement	  science	  to	  other	  disciplinary	  approaches.	  	  In	  his	  antipathy	  to	  complexity	  as	  “misapplied	  metaphor”	  the	  author	  of	  Let	  
them	  eat	  complexity	  is	  heir	  to	  a	  long	  and	  august	  lineage	  of	  anti-­‐rhetorical	  crusaders	  who	  regard	  metaphor	  as	  epistemologically	  and	  morally	  suspect.	  	  An	  array	  of	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  scholarship	  attests	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  with	  advances	  in	  science	  and	  mathematics	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  came	  new	  ideas	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world,	  and	  “a	  quickened	  impulse	  toward	  symbolic	  precision”.	  	  This	  entailed	  modeling	  language	  and	  thought	  on	  a	  “mathematicized”	  ideal,	  and	  an	  assault	  on	  rhetoric	  and	  other	  language	  forms	  perceived	  to	  harbor	  or	  encourage	  ambiguity.	  [19]	  	  Thus	  John	  Locke	  railed	  against	  figurative	  language	  that	  has	  no	  purpose	  other	  than	  to	  “insinuate	  the	  wrong	  Ideas,	  move	  the	  Passions,	  and	  thereby	  mislead	  the	  Judgment”	  as	  “perfect	  cheats”	  [19].	  	  	  According	  to	  such	  thinking,	  ambiguous	  language,	  epitomized	  by	  rhetoric	  and	  metaphor,	  became	  a	  locus	  of	  both	  moral	  and	  epistemological	  danger.	  	  The	  ensuing	  “flight	  from	  ambiguity”	  [19]	  was	  highly	  moralized,	  and	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  shift	  that	  accompanied	  the	  rise	  of	  modern	  science:	  the	  idea	  –	  and	  ideal	  –	  that	  language	  could	  and	  should	  describe	  the	  world	  in	  a	  completely	  neutral,	  transcriptive	  manner:	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The	  general	  feature	  of	  Enlightenment	  that	  contravenes	  inherited	  rhetorical	  tradition	  is	  the	  development,	  in	  various	  domains,	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  discourse	  conceived	  as	  neutral,	  non-­‐positional,	  and	  transparent.	  	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  tendency	  more	  apparent	  than	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  science,	  the	  most	  powerful	  innovation	  of	  the	  post-­‐Renaissance	  world.	  .	  .	  .	  From	  its	  beginning,	  science	  relied	  on	  the	  convention	  of	  a	  putatively	  true	  and	  undistorted	  –	  that	  is,	  arhetorical	  –	  depiction	  of	  natural	  states	  of	  affairs.	  [20]	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  language	  is	  to	  be	  stripped	  of	  any	  ornaments	  that	  might	  corrupt	  a	  normatively	  desirable	  correspondence	  between	  of	  word	  and	  world:	  	  The	  Royal	  Society	  in	  seventeenth-­‐century	  England	  .	  .	  .	  sought	  to	  cleanse	  language	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  excesses	  that	  would	  interfere	  with	  a	  proper,	  transparent	  relationship	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  denotation,	  a	  goal	  that	  appears	  to	  persist	  in,	  for	  example,	  logical	  positivism	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  [21]	  	  In	  sum,	  modern	  constructs	  of	  objectivity	  and	  science	  have	  been	  crucially	  bound	  up	  with	  a	  language	  ideology7	  that	  posits	  the	  possibility	  and	  epistemological	  propriety	  of	  language	  conceived	  as	  a	  “neutral,	  non-­‐positional,	  and	  transparent”	  medium.	  	  As	  familiar	  as	  this	  view	  of	  language	  might	  be,8	  	  it	  is	  not	  without	  its	  critics.	  	  What’s	  more,	  and	  contrary	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  disgruntled	  BMJ	  reader,	  skepticism	  about	  language	  as	  a	  neutral	  and	  transcriptive	  medium	  of	  representation	  need	  not	  issue	  from	  postmodernism	  or	  academic	  deconstructionism;	  nor	  need	  it	  call	  into	  question	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  	  Rather,	  such	  skepticism	  might	  simply	  assert	  that	  our	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world	  are	  inevitably	  partial	  and	  selective	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  observer	  and	  the	  phenomenological	  complexity	  of	  the	  object	  being	  described.	  	  Put	  differently,	  the	  map	  is	  not	  the	  territory.	  	  And	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  below,	  recognition	  of	  this	  gap	  –	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  word	  and	  world	  –	  is	  crucial	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Language	  ideologies	  refer	  to	  beliefs	  held	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relations	  among	  language	  and	  the	  world,	  and	  what	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  morally	  and	  epistemologically	  appropriate	  ways	  of	  using	  language.	  	  As	  such	  they	  are	  implicated	  in	  judgments	  about	  language	  users	  and	  the	  claims	  they	  make.	  [22,	  23]	  	  8	  It	  is	  widely	  held	  by	  sociolinguists	  that	  such	  of	  Locke-­‐inspired	  view	  of	  language	  also	  corresponds	  to	  Euro-­‐American	  common	  sense	  notions	  of	  language.	  	  According	  to	  this	  view	  language	  is	  regarded	  as	  “an	  autonomous	  system	  representing	  or	  corresponding	  to	  a	  separately	  accessible	  social	  world”	  and	  “naming	  and	  propositionality	  are	  the	  key	  functions	  of	  languages,	  which	  are	  seen	  as	  bounded	  systems”	  distinct	  from	  the	  social	  worlds	  they	  describe.	  [24]	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both	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  improvement	  science,	  especially	  as	  informed	  by	  philosophical	  pragmatism.	  	  Philosopher	  Nelson	  Goodman’s	  1972	  essay,	  “Seven	  Strictures	  on	  Similarity”	  provides	  an	  apt	  point	  of	  entry	  for	  considering	  why	  any	  categorical	  insistence	  on	  gap	  closure	  might	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  epistemologically	  dangerous,	  and	  how	  this	  caution	  informs	  improvement	  science.	  	  “Similarity”,	  Goodman	  claimed	  with	  rhetorical	  flourish,	  “is	  insidious”:	  	  Similarity,	  ever	  ready	  to	  solve	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  overcome	  obstacles,	  is	  a	  pretender,	  an	  impostor,	  a	  quack.	  	  It	  has,	  indeed,	  its	  place	  and	  its	  uses,	  but	  is	  more	  often	  found	  where	  it	  does	  not	  belong,	  professing	  powers	  it	  does	  not	  possess.	  	  [25]	  	  Translated	  into	  a	  more	  prosaic	  idiom,	  Goodman’s	  point	  was	  that	  ascriptions	  of	  similarity	  can	  be	  epistemologically	  and	  philosophically	  fraught	  because	  any	  reckoning	  of	  similarity	  will	  always	  be	  partial,	  and	  consequent	  upon	  selective	  attention	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  objects	  under	  consideration,	  and	  disattention	  to	  other	  aspects:	  	  As	  Nelson	  Goodman	  (1972)	  famously	  pointed	  out,	  similarity	  alone	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  empty	  explanatory	  construct:	  any	  two	  things	  can	  be	  similar	  or	  dissimilar	  as	  you	  like,	  depending	  on	  the	  respects	  in	  which	  their	  similarities	  or	  dissimilarities	  are	  described.	  	  The	  pigeon	  outside	  my	  window,	  the	  chair	  I’m	  sitting	  on,	  and	  the	  computer	  on	  my	  desk	  share	  numerous	  similarities	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  closeness	  to	  me,	  and	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  sun,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  They	  all	  share	  numerous	  dissimilarities	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  animacy,	  or	  lack	  of	  same,	  or	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  they	  are	  actually	  in	  my	  office	  or	  not,	  etc.	  	  Unless	  we	  specify	  the	  respects	  in	  which	  things	  are	  said	  to	  be	  similar,	  the	  act	  of	  saying	  that	  they	  are	  similar	  is	  an	  empty	  statement.	  	  [26]	  	  Going	  a	  step	  further,	  far	  from	  necessarily	  being	  an	  impediment	  to	  effective	  intervention	  in	  the	  world,	  recognition	  of	  the	  inescapably	  partial	  nature	  of	  our	  representations	  of	  the	  world	  is	  crucial	  to	  improvement	  methodologies.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  organizational	  theorist	  Haridimos	  Tsoukas:	  Our	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world	  are	  inherently	  incomplete.	  	  There	  always	  are	  more	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  world	  than	  those	  in	  use	  at	  any	  point	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in	  time	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Any	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  represented	  through	  other	  forms	  that	  may	  not	  yet	  have	  been	  stated	  or	  invented	  –	  indeed	  that	  is	  what	  is	  assumed	  by,	  say,	  efforts	  to	  continuously	  improve	  quality.	  	  .	  	  .What	  we	  have	  available	  is	  a	  finite	  representation	  of	  something,	  never	  a	  complete	  one.	  .	  .	  The	  thing	  can	  always	  be	  presented	  in	  more	  ways	  than	  we	  already	  know;	  the	  thing	  will	  always	  hold	  more	  appearances	  in	  reserve.	  [27]	  	  In	  this	  observation	  Tsoukas	  is	  nodding	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  out	  of	  which	  improvement	  science	  grows:	  American	  philosophical	  pragmatism	  as	  it	  developed	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  through	  the	  work	  of	  Harvard-­‐based	  philosophers	  C.S.	  Peirce,	  William	  James,	  John	  Dewey,	  and	  C.I.	  Lewis.9	  	  Two	  influential	  pioneers	  of	  improvement	  science,	  Walter	  Shewhart	  and	  W.	  Edwards	  Deming,	  were	  each	  powerfully	  influenced	  by	  pragmatism	  [10,	  29,	  30],	  and	  particularly	  by	  Lewis’s	  precept	  that	  the	  conceptual	  frames	  used	  to	  grasp	  and	  organize	  particular	  experiences	  are	  hypothetical	  in	  nature,	  and	  constantly	  subject	  to	  revision	  according	  to	  pragmatic	  needs	  [30].10	  	  A	  change	  of	  conceptual	  framework	  will	  elicit	  a	  new	  configuration	  of	  appearances,	  which	  can	  in	  turn	  become	  new	  resources	  for	  and	  objects	  of	  intervention.	  	  Put	  differently,	  if	  our	  models	  of	  the	  world	  are	  never	  completely	  isomorphic	  with	  their	  objects,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  world	  re-­‐described	  can	  be	  the	  world	  known	  differently.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  this	  insight	  that	  underlies	  a	  signature	  component	  of	  improvement	  methodologies,	  the	  PDSA	  (Plan-­‐Do-­‐Study-­‐Act)	  cycles	  whereby	  component	  processes	  of	  a	  system	  are	  iteratively	  intervened	  upon	  for	  purposes	  of	  continuous	  improvement	  [30].	  	  In	  conclusion:	  Improvement	  science	  as	  a	  para-­‐paradigm?	  What	  does	  this	  brief	  and	  partial	  survey	  of	  currents	  informing	  the	  development	  of	  improvement	  science	  tell	  us	  about	  its	  ecumenicalism	  as	  a	  field?	  	  Here	  I	  have	  drawn	  upon	  a	  range	  of	  disciplinary	  perspectives	  to	  suggest	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Although	  Peirce	  left	  Harvard	  in	  1879	  for	  employment	  at	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University,	  he	  remained	  an	  active	  and	  influential	  figure	  in	  the	  Harvard-­‐based	  circle	  of	  pragmatist	  philosophers	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Metaphysical	  Club”	  [28].	  10	  Recalling	  Nelson	  Goodman’s	  aforementioned	  philosophical	  concern	  with	  the	  misleading	  potential	  of	  ascriptions	  of	  similarity	  on	  account	  of	  their	  inevitably	  partial	  basis,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  he,	  too,	  worked	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  original	  pragmatists,	  completing	  his	  PhD	  at	  Harvard	  in	  1941	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  C.I.	  Lewis.	  	  [31]	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improvement	  science	  is	  informed	  by	  two	  tendencies	  that	  are	  in	  strong	  tension	  with	  one	  another.	  	  One	  tendency	  emphasizes	  the	  advantages	  and	  even	  necessity	  of	  what	  I’ve	  glossed	  here	  as	  gap	  closure:	  the	  drive	  to	  close	  spaces	  of	  misalignment	  (for	  example,	  between	  word	  and	  world),	  and	  to	  enforce	  clear	  and	  unambiguous	  boundaries	  (of	  language,	  of	  disciplines,	  and	  possibly	  of	  improvement	  science	  as	  a	  paradigm).	  	  This	  perspective	  gained	  coherence	  and	  force	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  modern	  development	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  and	  is	  today	  largely	  congruent	  with	  common	  sense	  within	  both	  clinical	  science	  and	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  Another	  perspective	  recognizes	  the	  benefits	  that	  flow	  from	  a	  less	  rigid	  insistence	  on	  alignment	  and	  gap	  closure,	  and	  counsels	  attentiveness	  to	  the	  partial	  and	  provisional	  character	  of	  our	  descriptions,	  categories,	  and	  models.	  This	  view	  is	  consonant	  with	  some	  of	  the	  philosophical	  precepts	  that	  inform	  improvement	  science,	  and	  has	  gained	  further	  elaboration	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  conjunction	  with	  what’s	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “complexity	  turn”	  [16].	  	  Can	  two	  such	  starkly	  contrasting	  positions	  both	  be	  held	  within	  improvement	  science?	  	  Can	  this	  gap	  be	  bridged,	  or	  is	  such	  an	  exercise	  of	  alignment	  even	  necessary?	  	  	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  two	  positions	  can	  both	  be	  held,	  and	  for	  reasons	  that	  might	  also	  provide	  grounds	  for	  considering	  improvement	  science	  itself	  to	  be	  an	  ecumenical	  enterprise,	  confidently	  receptive	  to	  a	  host	  of	  disciplinary	  approaches.	  	  To	  indicate	  why	  I	  believe	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  consider	  one	  possible	  argument	  to	  the	  contrary.	  	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  distance	  between	  these	  two	  perspectives	  is	  so	  great,	  their	  differences	  so	  fundamental,	  that	  they	  cannot	  both	  be	  accommodated	  within	  the	  same	  paradigm.	  	  In	  this	  case	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  “gap”	  between	  them	  is	  an	  unbridgeable	  chasm;	  that	  they	  are	  incommensurable.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  might	  be	  claimed	  that	  to	  assert	  otherwise	  would	  be	  to	  disregard	  the	  kind	  of	  internal	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  we	  tend	  to	  associate	  with	  a	  dominant	  paradigm	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  normal	  science.	  	  Such	  a	  concern	  seems	  to	  inform	  efforts	  to	  cast	  improvement	  science	  as	  a	  paradigm	  in	  
statu	  nascendi:	  as	  on	  its	  way	  to	  paradigmatic	  consolidation	  and	  normalization,	  but	  still	  falling	  short	  of	  consensus	  on	  its	  exact	  definition.	  [32]	  	  Such	  a	  view	  might	  urge	  that	  improvement	  science	  should	  be	  vigilantly	  defended	  against	  incursions	  by	  anything	  deemed	  to	  be	  insufficiently	  scientific.	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Yet	  invocation	  of	  the	  language	  of	  paradigms	  also	  suggests	  another	  possibility.	  	  On	  one	  hand	  the	  tension	  I	  have	  described	  within	  improvement	  science	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  classical	  instance	  of	  paradigmatic	  incommensurability.	  	  But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  improvement	  science	  the	  question	  of	  dialogue	  between	  supposedly	  incommensurable	  positions	  has	  an	  added	  twist.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  second	  position	  I	  have	  sketched	  (the	  pragmatic,	  complexity	  inflected	  view)	  itself	  contains	  something	  of	  an	  account	  of	  incommensurability:	  in	  acknowledging	  that	  different	  perceptual	  frames	  will	  capture	  different	  aspects	  of	  an	  endlessly	  complex	  world,	  and	  in	  evincing	  comfort	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  different	  renderings	  need	  not	  necessarily	  (as	  opposed	  to	  strategically)	  be	  reconciled,	  the	  second	  tendency	  seems	  somehow	  prophylactically	  protected	  against	  implication	  in	  the	  snares	  of	  incommensurability.	  	  In	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  a	  spider	  can	  nimbly	  glide	  along	  the	  filaments	  of	  its	  own	  web	  without	  getting	  caught,	  so	  too	  might	  we	  think	  of	  the	  second	  tendency	  I	  have	  described	  as	  being	  able	  to	  weave	  deftly	  among	  different	  positions,	  without	  becoming	  ensnared	  in	  a	  viciously	  unending	  circle	  of	  incommensurability.	  	  Absent	  the	  imperative	  to	  mind	  the	  gap,	  the	  vicious	  circle	  becomes	  one	  of	  virtue:	  an	  indication	  of	  plenitude	  rather	  than	  of	  epistemological	  infirmity.11	  As	  a	  final	  genealogical	  observation,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Kuhn’s	  own	  conception	  of	  paradigms	  was	  based	  on	  convictions	  that	  are	  strikingly	  congruent	  with	  those	  I	  have	  described	  in	  association	  with	  the	  pragmatism	  of	  C.I.	  Lewis,	  and	  with	  certain	  precepts	  associated	  with	  complexity	  theory.12	  	  For	  Kuhn	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  a	  paradigm	  was	  never	  absolute,	  but	  always	  relative	  to	  the	  perceptual	  and	  linguistic	  frameworks	  that	  necessarily	  delimited	  and	  simplified	  a	  universe	  that	  was	  otherwise	  “overwhelmingly	  dense,	  complex,	  and	  filled	  with	  epistemic	  possibilities”	  [34].	  	  According	  to	  Kuhn	  this	  boundless	  complexity	  had	  to	  be	  “cut”	  to	  be	  made	  manageable:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  In	  a	  related	  vein,	  sociologist	  Andrew	  Abbott	  [33]	  has	  suggested	  that	  because	  paradigms	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities	  are	  not	  guided	  by	  norms	  of	  “progress”	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  paradigms	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  are,	  they	  require	  other	  normative	  criteria	  for	  judgment.	  	  Abbott	  makes	  a	  good	  case	  for	  “plenitude”	  and	  “plurality”	  as	  normative	  criteria	  for	  knowledge	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities.	  12	  During	  his	  intellectually	  formative	  years	  at	  Harvard	  (1940-­‐1956)	  a	  young	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  may	  have	  encountered	  both	  C.I.	  Lewis,	  who	  taught	  there	  from	  1920-­‐1953,	  and	  Nelson	  Goodman,	  who	  completed	  his	  PhD	  at	  Harvard	  in	  1941.	  	  With	  his	  election	  to	  Harvard’s	  Society	  of	  Fellows,	  Kuhn	  would	  have	  almost	  certainly	  encountered	  one	  of	  Lewis’s	  most	  renowned	  students,	  the	  philosopher	  W.V.	  Quine.	  	  	  (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-­‐kuhn/)	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.	  .	  .	  natural	  language	  provides	  a	  finite	  means	  of	  mediating	  an	  infinitely	  complex	  universe.	  .	  .	  .Put	  more	  accurately	  –	  we	  in	  fact	  live	  in	  a	  world	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  our	  language	  admits.	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  act	  in	  it,	  we	  must	  simplify	  it,	  and	  our	  choice	  of	  a	  particular	  manner	  of	  simplification	  (a	  cut)	  is	  pragmatically	  determined	  and	  is	  embodied	  in	  our	  language.	  [34]	   	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  this	  reflexive	  dimension	  of	  improvement	  science	  –	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  seems	  well-­‐equipped	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  its	  own	  internal	  inconsistencies	  –	  perhaps	  it	  is	  better	  considered	  as	  something	  other	  than	  a	  paradigm	  as	  conventionally	  understood	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  Such	  a	  view	  would	  in	  no	  way	  detract	  from	  the	  power	  of	  improvement	  science;	  rather	  it	  would	  comprise	  a	  clear-­‐eyed	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  field’s	  defacto	  richness	  and	  heterogeneity,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  theoretical	  foundations	  and	  interdisciplinary	  influences	  and	  methods,	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  historical	  development	  as	  described	  here.	  	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  field’s	  heterogeneity,	  perhaps	  improvement	  science	  is	  better	  considered	  as	  a	  para-­‐paradigm:	  as	  a	  vital	  adjunct	  to	  clinical	  science,	  but	  one	  which	  resists	  modelling	  on	  the	  template	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  If	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  clinical	  science	  derives	  from	  scrupulous	  obedience	  to	  the	  imperative	  to	  “mind	  the	  gap”,	  improvement	  science	  as	  a	  supportive	  adjunct	  could	  be	  said	  to	  draw	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  its	  strength	  from	  a	  principled	  and	  reflexive	  ability	  to	  selectively	  not	  mind	  the	  gap.	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